Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections
The Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, to be held in seven phases, are just round the corner. Not only is U.P. important because it is the “heartland” of imagined cultural notions of Indian nationhood, but also because it contains almost all social trends that constitute the political dynamics of independent India. It has a gradual caste hierarchy spanning the Dwija category, intermediate OBC castes and Dalits. The only component not strongly represented is the tribal component. It is the civilisational core of the Gangetic plain – a region that has supported populations and civilization for 3500 years. And it is the heartland of Indian Islam (also of the idea of Pakistan).
Social (mainly caste) composition
The state has a sizeable upper caste component (20%) comprising Brahmins (10% according to the 1994 Rapid Census and over 9% according to the 1931 census, the only one that talked about caste), over 7% Rajputs ( Thakurs), 4% Banias and Kayasths combined, and 2% Jats (1.4%), Bhumihars (0.4%) and Tyagis taken together. The OBC Kurmis also have a small presence. They have a high population (15-20%) in Robertsganj.
The Jats are concentrated in the western districts, where they are traditionally one of the landed castes. Paul Brass’ case study of Aligarh district, for instance, shows that 20% of the Zamindars of the district at the time of the 1952 Zamindari abolition were Jats, just below Thakurs (24%) and above Brahmins (14.4%). The Tyagis, who claim to be Brahmins, again are a dominant landed caste found in some of the western districts. The Bhumihars, another dominant caste claiming Brahmin status, are found in the eastern districts, particularly Varanasi, Ghazipur and Azamgarh.
The 1994 Rapid Census places the Scheduled Castes at 22% and the OBCs at 37%, the Yadavs alone being over 8%. Etah, Saidpur, Azamgarh, Jaunpur and Ghazipur, etc., have sizeable Yadav poulations.
Muslims constitute 16% of the population of the state.
The only caste-group that constitutes close to 25% population in many districts are the Dalits.
Implications
The political behavior of this large state has to be seen in relation to these caste and religious identities. In his book “Interrogating Caste”, eminent sociologist Dipankar Gupta has argued that the voting patterns of different U.P. districts do not necessarily correspond to caste. Though he is right in claiming that other factors have also to be taken into account, he has perhaps over-stretched the point and missed the woods for the trees. Any meta-study of U.P. spanning the last 50 years can show how different caste mobilizations have altered political equations in the state, almost permanently. Caste coalitions and patron-client relations have been central to this. The coming posts shall seek to delineate these changes, beginning with the terminal decline of the Congress in the political Pitrbhumi of the Nehru family.
Social (mainly caste) composition
The state has a sizeable upper caste component (20%) comprising Brahmins (10% according to the 1994 Rapid Census and over 9% according to the 1931 census, the only one that talked about caste), over 7% Rajputs ( Thakurs), 4% Banias and Kayasths combined, and 2% Jats (1.4%), Bhumihars (0.4%) and Tyagis taken together. The OBC Kurmis also have a small presence. They have a high population (15-20%) in Robertsganj.
The Jats are concentrated in the western districts, where they are traditionally one of the landed castes. Paul Brass’ case study of Aligarh district, for instance, shows that 20% of the Zamindars of the district at the time of the 1952 Zamindari abolition were Jats, just below Thakurs (24%) and above Brahmins (14.4%). The Tyagis, who claim to be Brahmins, again are a dominant landed caste found in some of the western districts. The Bhumihars, another dominant caste claiming Brahmin status, are found in the eastern districts, particularly Varanasi, Ghazipur and Azamgarh.
The 1994 Rapid Census places the Scheduled Castes at 22% and the OBCs at 37%, the Yadavs alone being over 8%. Etah, Saidpur, Azamgarh, Jaunpur and Ghazipur, etc., have sizeable Yadav poulations.
Muslims constitute 16% of the population of the state.
The only caste-group that constitutes close to 25% population in many districts are the Dalits.
Implications
The political behavior of this large state has to be seen in relation to these caste and religious identities. In his book “Interrogating Caste”, eminent sociologist Dipankar Gupta has argued that the voting patterns of different U.P. districts do not necessarily correspond to caste. Though he is right in claiming that other factors have also to be taken into account, he has perhaps over-stretched the point and missed the woods for the trees. Any meta-study of U.P. spanning the last 50 years can show how different caste mobilizations have altered political equations in the state, almost permanently. Caste coalitions and patron-client relations have been central to this. The coming posts shall seek to delineate these changes, beginning with the terminal decline of the Congress in the political Pitrbhumi of the Nehru family.

2 Comments:
Cheri said
***
As you rightly point out, caste coalitions have been, and continue to
remain, the prime factors on which elections in UP are won and lost.
The last elections, where the Thakur
vote en-masse migrated away from the BJP to the SP, are a case in
point - the issue being the BJP not opposing enough the 'humiliation'
of the Thakurs, as evidenced by Mayavati slapping POTA and allied
cases against Raja Bhayya and his father.
Nonetheless, the social formations through which we analyse UP
politics - Dalit, Muslim, upper caste, OBC- are not homogenous. There
are considerable rivalries within these social groups. It is not
entirely surprising, for these formations are quite modern frames
constructed over groups that have their own histories of cooperation
and rivalries. One cannot see any of them as a monolith - even among
them there have been hierarchies.
More so, in a time of silent revolution, despite attempts to weld the
Dalits or OBC's into a homogenous class, there is the pre-eminence of
one particular caste over the rest. In case of the Dalits, it is the
Chamar/Jatav, in the case of the OBC's it is the Yadav.
If we look at the upper castes, there is the famous Brahmin-Thakur
rivalry, so much so that one can almost predict the voting pattern of
one from that of the other's.
Even among the Muslims, there is a divide between the Ashrafis and the
rest, with the upper class - Awadhi- gentry still votaries of the
Congress, and the lower classes of the SP.
It is in these internal (and also the intra-) rivalries that
fluidities can manifest themselves. The SP-BSP government of 1993, for
instance: it could be seen as a coalition of the lower classes. It
failed, not simply because of Mayavati and Mulayam Singh Yadav, but
also because of the ground realities that the Dalits were probably
more antagonistic to the landed classes which constituted the SP's
vote-bank, rather than to the savarnas that theoretically opposed
both. It was not surprising that the avarna BSP turned to the savarna
BJP, against the SP!
Another interesting factor is the Brahmin vote, and Mayavati's
newfound love for the tilak. For some time, the Brahmin vote has been
for the asking of candidates and not parties. If memory serves me
right, the Brahman Mahasabha has a position that it would support any
candidate who puts the caste's interests in the forefront.
Mayavati, and the BSP, have come to terms with the fact that in a
electoral democratic polity, the exclusive wooing of a particular
community may get you votes, but not enough to rule absolutely. The
BSP has reached saturation point as far as the Dalit vote is
concerned, and, for now, it is a captive votebank. Hence, the
preoccupation with expanding its base.
The Brahmin votes seem the easiest target - for the Thakurs vote will
be spread between the SP and the BJP, and the Banias will vote for the
BJP. Plus, the Brahmin vote has coexisted with the Dalit vote; after
all, it was the Congress's winning strategy for a long time in UP.
Plus, the Brahmin vote has been looking for a suitable party, having
tried the Congress and the BJP.
Amarmani Tripathi will serve as an apt example. Starting his career as
a strongman of eastern UP's leading don, Harishankar Tiwari, he's been
with the Congress and the BJP. He was a minister in the BJP government
(dismissed for his role in a kidnap case), then in the BSP government
(dismissed for his role in the murder of his mistress) and then in the
SP government. Now, he's shifted back to the BSP.
The Muslim vote patterns ought to be interesting - with two new
parties coming up for grabs. Any communal polarisation in UP helps the
SP and the BJP, and the SP - whose tactial alliance with the BJP is a
known fact - is not averse to heightening tensions.
Gorakhpur is an example. Take the arrest of Yogi Adityanath, the BJP
MP after a death during Muharram. Now, anybody acquainted with the
region will tell you that the Yogi, who's associated with the Hindu
Mahasabha and the VHP, styles himself as the protector of Hindus. He
also makes it a point to prove this during Holi, when processions are
taken through Muslim areas. Muharram clashes are not unknown as well
in Gorakhpur.
Yet, this is the first time he's been arrested for his role (he
violated Section 144). It was no coincidence that elections were round
the corner and the SP was facing an erosion of its Muslim vote-bank.
The clashes that followed would help both the BJP: the Hindutva
constituency would rally around the Yogi and would translate into
votes for him and his supporters, and the Muslim vote, which could
have fragmented, was bound up - through fear.
It is also interesting to note that the BSP has fielded lesser Muslim
candidates this time. Mayavati has also hinted she is veering to a
'non-appeasement' line vis-à-vis the Muslims.
And Rahul Gandhi, the Congress' great hope (sic!) in UP (which should
be enough for any sane observer to write the party's obituary), has
been trying hard to look pro-Muslim - even to the extent of forgetting
his father's complicity in getting the locks on the Babri Masjid
opened and in the VHP's shilanyas in Ayodhya.
Alas, the clergy, Shia and Sunni alike, aren't pleased... The young
man from Harvard should stick to romancing exotic beauties (and as our
guruji remarked, maybe model for colognes and underwear).
As a pointer to the results of the elections, we could look at the
municipal elections in UP. The BJP did surprisingly well. The BSP did
not contest, preferring to throw its weight on a non-party basis in
each corporation.
While corporations are different from constituencies, there is a
definite signal here - the BJP is rising, and the BSP seems most
likely to forge a post-poll alliance with them.
My call on the UP elections: A BSP-BJP coalition government, the SP
the main opposition, the Congress decimated, and lots of defections.
But looking longer term, there is quite some churn that we might
expect. As I pointed earlier, the intra-group rivalries will manifest
themselves. At some point, the non-Jatav Dalits will find a new party.
The Kurmis have already begun the process of the desegregation of the
OBC vote.
And, I'm always hopeful of an election fought on bijli-sadak-pani.
Not to suggest that elections in UP are fought and won on primordial
affiliations. There is an intelligence that the voter displays every
time he or she votes. If a vote is cast for a caste-based party, it is
not so much because of the voter's feeling of affinity towards caste
brethren, but from the understanding that he or she stands to gain
from a fellow-caste man (sic) in power. In feudal UP, it is often that
social standing is at a premium than economic standing. We cannot
expect a subaltern voter to vote for 9 percent GDP growth, when his
access to bijli-sadak-pani are restricted by caste barriers.
EXCELLANT ARTICLE. Brahmins and Dalits should join together for unity for the welfare of the country and that is the need of the hour. The ancient (nearly 5000 years old) Indian philosophy of keepiing mind and body for the well being, has entered the managerial, medical and judicial domain of the world. Today it has found its place as an alternative to the theory of modern management and also as a means to bring back the right path of peace and prosperity for the human beings. UP and India will prosper
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